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1. Introduction 
The financial system plays a fundamental role in the global economy as the middleman 
between agents who need to borrow and agents who are willing to lend or invest. As a 
consequence, it is naturally linked to all economic sectors and therefore, if the financial 
system does not work properly, its problems have a strong impact on the real economy. For 
instance, in the current crisis, the total cost to G-20 countries of the bail-out of the financial 
system is around $10.8 trillion as of September 2009.1 However, the cost of the crisis is not 
limited to the bail-outs. Substantial costs are also incurred by the negative evolution of the 
fundamental macro variables such as GDP growth rate, unemployment rates and 
government deficits, among others. For instance, the annual GDP growth rate2 decreased 
from 3.09% in 2007 to -4.09% in 2009 in the European Union. In the US, this rate decreased 
from 2.14% to -2.45%. With respect to the unemployment rate, it increased from 7.8% in 
January 2007 to 9.4% in November 2009 in the European Union. In the US, this rate 
increased from 4.6% to 10% in the same period. Regarding the government deficits3, they 
dramatically increased from 0.8% in 2007 to 6.7% in 2009 in the European Union, and in 
the same period, US government deficits increased from 1.14% to 9.9%.  
As many of these problems come from events related with systemic risk propagating from 
the banking sector to the real economy, it is important to understand the relationship among 
measures of systemic risk and give an indication of the relative usefulness of the available 
measures. This papers aims to shed some light on these pressing issues by means of an 
                                                 
1 The BBC stated on 10 September 2009 that according to IMF data, G-20 countries have spent $10.8 trillion. 
However, most of the bail-outs are in the form of guarantees to the financial system and hence, governments 
hope to recover some of the money. http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/business/8248434.stm. Concretely, the IMF 
estimated global losses to be around $3.4 trillion by October 2009.  
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/gfsr/2009/02/pdf/press.pdf 
2 Annual percentages of constant price GDP are year-on-year changes. 
3 Government deficits are expressed as a proportion of the GDP. 
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empirical analysis of the most widely used and well-known measures of systemic risk 
employed by investors and regulators worldwide. 
Acharya and Richardson (2009) discuss the factors causing the near collapse of the global 
financial system (mainly the combination of a credit boom and a housing bubble) and give 
several proposals for regulatory reform. Regarding systemic risk, they propose a definition 
of systemic risk which involves its effect on the real economy and a device for reducing it 
through taxation.4 Following a similar approach, Brunnermeier (2009) presents a description 
of the “originate and distribute” model and an event logbook of the crisis for the period 
2007-2008. In an environment of mild economic conditions, financial institutions have 
taken advantage of many financial innovations (e.g., Credit Default Swaps or Collateralized 
Debt Obligations, among others), some of them very complex and with unexpected 
downside effects in scenarios of financial distress. Nonetheless, the problem is not only that 
the financial system is in trouble during the crisis but the whole economy is also affected. 
This relationship and the search for the best performing systemic risk measure is our basic 
motivation for addressing the relative performance of the available systemic risk measures.  
Billio, Gertmansnki, Lo and Pelizzon (2010) use monthly data to study the 
interconnectedness among the returns of hedge funds, banks, brokers, and insurance 
companies but they use only two measures: principal components analysis and Granger-
causality tests. They find that all four sectors have become highly interrelated over the past 
decade, possibly increasing the level of systemic risk in the finance and insurance industries, 
and they suggest that hedge funds can provide early indications of market dislocation. 
In this paper, we concentrate on what are widely acknowledged to be the most important 
systemic actors: the biggest banks in the two biggest economic areas (the European Union 
                                                 
4 These ideas are extended in other papers: Acharya, Pedersen, Philippon and Richardson (2010a and 
2010b). 
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and the US).5 We employ daily data and we compare a comprehensive set of measures. 
Specifically, we compute six different sets of systemic risk measures for a sample of the 20 
biggest European and 13 biggest US banks from January 2004 to November 2009.6 The six 
measures are based on i) Principal components of the bank’s Credit Default Swaps (CDSs), 
ii) Interbank interest rates, iii) Structural (Merton (1973)) credit risk models, iv) 
Collateralized Debt Obligations (CDOs) indexes and their tranches v) Multivariate densities 
computed from CDS spreads and vi) Co-Risk measures. We then compare them using three 
different criteria: i) Causality tests, ii) Price discovery test, and iii) their correlation with an 
index of systemic events. 
Our main empirical findings are as follows. For the European market, the best indicator is   
the LIBOR-OIS spread followed by the first Principal Component of the single-name CDSs 
whereas the least reliable indicator is the Delta Co-Expected Shortfall. For the US market, 
the best indicator is the first Principal Component of the single-name CDSs followed by the 
spread LIBOR-TBILL, whereas the least reliable indicator is the systemic spread extracted 
from the CDO indexes and their tranches.  
Therefore, our results imply that the better performing measures of systemic risk are based 
on simple indicators obtained from credit derivatives and interbank markets. On the other 
hand, indicators relying on structural models or complex statistical procedures do not 
perform particularly well in our sample. The implications for investors and regulators are 
straightforward. Look for simple, robust indicators based directly on liquid market prices 
and be aware of overcomplicated modelling based on dubious assumptions and of the 
inferences from the prices of financial products traded in thin markets. 
                                                 
5 Billio et al. (2010) find that banks may be more central to systemic risk than non-bank financial institutions 
that engage in banking functions. 
6 In a recent study, the International Monetary Fund (2009) posits that smaller institutions may also contribute 
to systemic risk if they are closely interconnected. However, systemic risk should be most readily observed in 
the largest banks. 
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This paper is divided into 6 sections. Section 2 reviews the literature. In Section 3, we give a 
brief description of the dataset employed in our analysis. Section 4 describes the different 
measures of systemic risk proposed in the extant literature. This section also includes the 
estimation of these measures using our database. In Section 5, we compare these measures 
among groups and run a “horse race” among them using three different criteria. Section 6 
concludes. 
2. Literature Review 
There is no general agreement on the definition of systemic risk.7 De Bandt and Hartmann 
(2002) survey theoretical and empirical approaches and define systemic risk as a “systemic 
event that affects a considerable number of financial institutions or markets, thereby 
severely impairing the general well-functioning of the financial system”. A different 
approach is taken by Kaufman (2000) and Kaufman and Scott (2003), who define systemic 
risk as “the risk or probability of breakdown in an entire system and it is evidenced by co-
movements (correlations) among most or all the parts”. They assign the most frequent 
concepts about systemic risk to three groups: macro shocks, micro level and spillover effects 
though indirect interconnections. Billio et al. (2010) state that “Systemic risk can be defined 
as the probability that a series of correlated defaults among financial institutions, occurring 
over a short time span, will trigger a withdrawal of liquidity and widespread loss of 
confidence in the financial system as a whole”. Recently, the Financial Stability Report of 
ECB (December 2009) classified theoretical and empirical papers about systemic risk into 
three categories: contagion, macro shocks and unwinding of imbalances. 
Although the definition of systemic risk diverges among papers, the common factor is the 
generalized distress of financial institutions, which makes it difficult for the financial system 
                                                 
7 In the Global Financial Stability Report by the IMF (2009), it is recognized that systemic risk is a term 
widely used but difficult to define and quantify. 
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to perform well. On the basis of this characteristic, we define systemic risk as the risk of 
suffering an adverse effect on the real economy derived from the malfunctioning of the 
financial sector. Clearly, the worse is the situation in the financial system, the stronger is the 
systemic risk, although this relationship is not necessarily linear. 
Until recently, academic research has mainly focused on measuring idiosyncratic and 
systematic risk, ignoring, at least in part, the importance of systemic risk. For instance, for 
the case of the banking industry, the Basel I (1988) and Basel II (2004) Accords design risk 
management policy on the basis of the banks’ portfolios, ignoring interconnection among 
banks. Therefore, no provision for systemic risk is included in the current regulatory 
framework. 
Interest in systemic risk is relatively new. At the end of the 1990s, concern about the 
stability of the international financial system increased as a consequence of the crisis in 
Mexico (1994), Asia (1997), Russia (1998) and Brazil (1999).8  
Nevertheless, systemic risk measures have attracted more attention in recent years. Going 
beyond traditional approaches based on pure contagion, new dimensions of systemic risk 
have been developed. These dimensions are related to interconnections to common factors. 
Researchers realize that the rise in the complexity and globalization of financial services 
has contributed to establishing strong interconnections among financial institutions. In this 
vein, credit derivatives like CDOs and CDSs have played a crucial role, in part because they 
are new products which are traded in bilateral transactions Over-The-Counter (OTC), and 
as result, they involve greater counterparty risk and less transparency. As a consequence, 
the disquiet about systemic risk has been growing as well as the notional value of 
                                                 
8 This disquiet was voiced by none other than Alan Greenspan, chairman of the Federal Reserve (1986-2006):   
“Second only to its macrostability responsibilities is the central bank's responsibility to use its authority and 
expertise to forestall financial crises (including systemic disturbances in the banking system) and to manage 
such crises once they occur.” 
Testimony of Alan Greenspan, March 19, 1997 
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outstanding CDSs and CDOs.9 In fact, the relationship between these credit derivatives and 
economy-wide risk has already been documented in the literature (see Mayordomo and 
Peña, 2010).  
Regarding the measurement of systemic risk, two complementary approaches, macro and 
micro, can be employed. The macro or aggregated approach focuses on the evolution of 
macro indicators in order to detect possible bubbles in the economy. Some examples of this 
approach are Borio and Lowe (2002a, 2002b and 2004) and Borio and Drehmann (2009), 
who propose to measure the financial unwinding of imbalances by means of price 
misalignments in some key indicators like inflation-adjusted equity prices or private sector 
leverage. The micro approach focuses on the individual institutions’ financial health to 
determine the level of systemic risk in the economy (i.e., portfolio) by means of analyzing 
both market and accounting information. In this paper, we focus mainly on the micro level, 
analyzing the market information provided by individual institutions. The macro level is 
also studied by means of the interest rates. In any case, we realize that both approaches are 
complementary to each other. 
Although some papers have addressed the problem of systemic risk10, few of them propose 
measures that allow surveillance institutions to monitor the aggregate level of the systemic 
risk and its concentration in key financial intermediaries. These measures could play a 
relevant role as leading indicators of future impending crises. Lehar (2005) proposes 
extracting systemic risk measures on the basis of Merton’s model (1973).  Using Monte 
Carlo simulations, the author proposes a measure of systemic risk which is based on the 
probability that banks with total assets of more than a certain percentage ε of all banks’ 
                                                 
9 To give an example, the outstanding notional amount of CDS was $8.42 trillion at the end of 2004 and $62.2 
trillion at the end of 2007. Once the subprime crises broke out, the outstanding notional amount decreased to 
$38.6 trillion at the end of 2008 (source ISDA). 
10 See Bartram, Brown and Hund (2005), who analyze the global banking system through event study 
methodology; Brühler and Prokopczuk (2007), who analyze tail dependence of stock returns by means of an 
Archimedean copula; and Avesani, García and Li (2006), who construct an indicator for sector surveillance 
using the default probabilities of an nth-to-default CDS basket of large and complex financial institutions. 
 8
assets go bankrupt within a short period of time. Additionally, the author proposes a similar 
measure of systemic risk as the probability that more than a certain fraction of all banks go 
bankrupt at the same time. Allenspach and Monnin (2007) improve Lehar’s measure by 
estimating, through a structural model, the banks’ asset-to-debt ratio. As an alternative to 
structural models, other authors employ CDSs to measure systemic risk. Bhansali, Gingrich 
and Longstaff (2008) extract the idiosyncratic, systematic and systemic risks from U.S 
(CDX) and European (iTraxx) prices of indexed credit derivatives by means of a linearized 
three-jump model.  Huang, Zhou and Zhou (2009) propose creating a synthetic CDO whose 
underlying portfolio consists of debt instruments issued by banks to measure the systemic 
risk of the banking system through the spread of the tranche that captures losses higher than 
15%. Segoviano and Goodhart (2009) propose a set of banking stability measures11 based 
on distress dependence, which is estimated by the Banking System Multivariate Density 
(BSMD). Their procedure for estimating the multidensity function (CIMDO-copula) is able 
to capture both linear and non-linear distress dependences and allows changes throughout 
the economic cycle.12 Finally, Adrian and Brunnermeier (2008) propose a set of “co-risk 
management” measures based on traditional management tools. They estimate the 
institution i’s Co-Value-at-Risk (CoVaRi) as the whole system (i.e., portfolio)’s Value-at-
Risk (VaRs) conditioned on institution i being in distress (i.e., being at its unconditional 
VaRi level). On the basis of CoVaR, they calculate the marginal contribution of institution i 
to the overall systemic risk as the difference between CoVaR and the unconditional whole 
system’s VaR, which we denoted as iCoVaRΔ . 
In this article, we shed light on the relative quality of the aforementioned measures, 
comparing them by using three different criteria in the context of the current financial crisis. 
                                                 
11 The authors propose three different categories of measures: (a) common distress in the banks of the system; 
(b) distress between specific banks; (c) distress in the system associated with a specific bank.  
12 By means of CIMDO-copula, the authors overcome the drawbacks of the characterization of distress 
dependence of financial returns with correlations, which has been one of the most popular approaches for 
measuring systemic risk.  
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3. Dataset 
Our analysis of systemic risk is based on two portfolios which contain the largest western 
Europe (including non-Eurozone) and United States (US) banks. Regarding the former 
portfolio, we select the largest western European banks according to the “The Banker” 
ranking for which we have information about CDS spreads, liabilities and equity prices. 
With respect to the US bank portfolio, we select the largest US banks according to the FED 
ranking13 for which we have information about CDS spreads, liabilities and equity prices. 
Our final sample is composed of 20 European banks and 13 US banks and is summarized in 
Table 1, which also contains the average portfolio weights on the basis of their market 
capitalization during the sample period. 
The main inputs of the measures are single-name CDS spreads, liabilities and equity prices. 
The CDS spreads and equity prices are reported on a daily basis (end of day) while the 
liabilities are reported on annual terms. These variables are obtained either from Reuters or 
DataStream depending on the data availability in both data sources. Additionally, other 
variables are required. For instance, the 3-month and 10-year LIBOR, swap rates and 
treasury yields are needed. We employ interest rates from the two economic areas: US and 
the Eurozone.14, 15 These variables are obtained from Reuters. Moreover, CDO index 
spreads are also employed: the US CDO index Investment Grade (IG) spreads (CDX IG 5y) 
and the European one (iTraxx IG 5y) as well as their tranches. The CDX index has six 
tranches with attach and detach points at 0%, 3%, 7%, 10%, 15%, 30% and 100% while the 
                                                 
13 In both cases, we require the bank to have been included in the top 25 and 40 of the list of western Europe 
and US banks, respectively, at least once between 2004 and 2009. Banks that have been taken over or gone 
bankrupt are employed until the moment when such events happened.  
14 Reuters uses French government bonds as the benchmark for the Eurozone up to 05/08/2010. After that date, 
German government bonds are the benchmark. 
15 Our western European portfolio is composed of Eurozone and non-Eurozone banks (i.e., Denmark, Sweden, 
Switzerland and the UK). Regarding the second group, we also analyzed the UK’s Libor spreads because of 
the global importance of that financial system. However, analysis of UK spreads does not add additional 
information to Eurozone spreads. 
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iTraxx has also six tranches with attach and detach points at 0%, 3%, 6%, 9%, 12%, 22% 
and 100%. Those index spreads for the different tranches are gathered from Markit.   
The sample spans from January 1, 2004 to November 4, 2009. This sample period allows us 
to study the behavior of the systemic risk measures in both pre-crisis and crisis periods 
because August 2007 is commonly considered the starting point of the sub-prime crisis. 
However, the sample period used for the CDO indexes is slightly shorter. Concretely, CDX 
IG 5y spans from March 2006 to November 2009 while iTraxx IG 5y spans from March 
2005 to November 2009 due to the lack of data at the beginning of the sample period. 
During certain periods of the crisis, the on-the-roll (i.e., the one that corresponds to the 
current index’s series and version) market is dried out and no spreads are available. In these 
cases, we replace them with the closest available out-the-roll series spreads.    
4. Measures 
In this section, we briefly summarize the systemic risk measures which are proposed in the 
literature and based on market information and report our estimation for these measures 
using our dataset. We classify those measures into six different groups: (i) based on a 
Principal Component Analysis (PCA) of CDS spreads; (ii) based on interbank interest rates; 
(iii) based on structural models; (iv) based on the Collateralized Debt Obligations (CDO) 
indexes and their tranches; (v) based on multivariate densities which are recovered through 
CDS spreads; (vi) based on “co-risk management” measures such as Delta CoVaR.16   
                                                 
16 “Co-risk management” measures refer to the conditional, co-movement or even contagion measures which 
are estimated on the basis of traditional risk management tools like Value-at-Risk and Expected Shortfall.  
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a. PCA of CDS 
CDSs are credit derivatives that provide insurance against the risk of default of a certain 
company (“name”), and hence, their spreads measure the risk that is faced by bondholders 
of the reference entity.   
The first measure that we implement consists of performing a Principal Component 
Analysis (PCA) on a pool of the CDS spreads. Longstaff and Rajan (2007) analyze the CDS 
spreads of the components of the CDX index. They find that there is a dominant factor that 
mainly drives the spreads across all industries, which is consistent with the existence of an 
economy-wide or systemic risk component.  
In our sample, we find that 93% and 90% of the bank’s CDSs variance is explained by the 
first Principal Component Factor (PCF) in European and US banks, respectively, in 
agreement with Longstaff and Rajan (2008).   
Figure 1 shows the evolution of both principal components during the whole sample period. 
From January 2004 to July 2007, both components remain almost flat. When the crisis starts 
in August 2007, and until March 2009, both variables follow an upward trend in which three 
peaks are clearly noticeable: March 2008, September 2008 and March 2009.17 Both factors 
are largely similar but in the period from September 2008 to December 2008, which 
corresponds to a period of high stress in the US markets after the bankruptcy of the Lehman 
Brothers, the US factor is higher. After March 2009, both variables decrease noticeably and 
at the end of the sample period, the levels of these variables return to a level similar to the 
one at the beginning of 2008, but still clearly above their pre-crisis levels.  
                                                 
17 The first two peaks coincide with the Bear Stearns and Lehman Brothers episodes. Regarding the last one, 
there is not a clear reason as in the previous cases, although we guess that it is due to huge losses of the 
insurance giant AIG which were publically reported on March 2, 2009, and were the largest quarterly loss in 
US corporate history. 
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The first principal components are highly correlated with all banks’ CDS. In the European 
(US) case, the highest correlation is 0.98 (0.98) with respect to BBVA (State Street Corp) 
and the lowest is 0.84 (0.85) with respect to Fortis (Capital One FC). 
b. Libor Spreads 
The second group of systemic risk measures involves the use of the LIBOR18 as the 
reference interest rate relative to either the Overnight Interest Swap (OIS) or Treasury bills 
(TBill)19, usually known in the literature as LIBOR spreads.20 The first measure is defined 
as the difference between the 3-month LIBOR rate and the 3-month Overnight Interest 
Swap (OIS). The second measure is defined as the difference between the 3-month LIBOR 
rate and 3-month Treasury bills. These measures are employed by Brunnermeier (2009) to 
describe the event logbook of the current crisis and by the Global Financial Stability Report 
by the IMF (2009), among others.  
These two proxies of systemic risk are similar, but important conceptual differences appear 
between them. The LIBOR represents the unsecured interest rate at which banks lend money 
to other banks which satisfy certain creditworthiness criteria. Typically, the banks’ credit 
rating must be at least AA. LIBOR is not totally free of credit risk because it reflects 
liquidity risk and the bank’s default risk over the following months. On the other hand, OIS 
is equivalent to the average of the overnight interest rates expected until maturity. It is 
almost riskless and hence it is not subject to pressures associated with those risks. Therefore, 
LIBOR minus OIS, or LIBOR-OIS (LO henceforth), reflects liquidity and default risk over 
the following months. In tranquil periods, this measure should be very low because AA 
                                                 
18 We use the LIBOR for the main currencies under study (i.e., USD LIBOR and EURIBOR, obtained from 
Reuters). 
19 In Section 3, we work with Eurozone Treasury bills. We repeated the analysis of this section, using  German 
Treasury bills as a benchmark, and results did not change significantly. 
20 These measures do not directly refer to the individual financial institution’s financial health, but give 
information about the overall situation of the banking industry. 
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credit rating institutions should not have either significant liquidity risk or default risk. 
However, in periods of turmoil, this spread should widen so as to capture these risks.  
LIBOR minus Treasury bill or LIBOR-TBILL (LT henceforth) is the second systemic risk 
measure considered in this section. Treasury bill rates are the rates that an investor earns on 
Treasury bills. In times of crisis, most lenders only accept Treasuries as collateral, pushing 
down Treasury rates. Hence, LT captures not only liquidity and default risk but also the 
additional fact that, during periods of turmoil, investors lend against Treasury bills (the best 
form of collateral), measuring the “flight to quality” effect. In tranquil periods, LT should be 
very low, while in periods of turmoil, this spread should be larger. Additionally, we 
computed what we name the “Natives Are Restless Factor” (NARF)21, namely, the 
difference between the LT and LO spreads (or, equivalently, the OIS-TBILL difference). In 
normal times, the NARF should be close to zero. However, when investors feel growing 
disquiet because of an unexpected increase in market uncertainty, they are more willing to 
pay an extra amount to buy the supposedly safer government securities (lowering their 
yields) and then the NARF increases. 
Figure 2 depicts the evolution of the Libor spreads and the dashed area shows the size of the 
NARF. Panel A refers to the Eurozone (EU) and Panel B refers to the United States (US). 
The difference between the pre-crisis and crisis periods is clearly seen. The first period is 
characterized by low and almost constant spreads. These spreads are lower than 10 basis 
points (b.p.) with the exception of the US LT, which remains around the 30 b.p. line. Note 
that this Libor spread starts an upward movement by May 2007, while other spreads remain 
unchanged up to August 2007. The reason could be associated with the role that Treasury 
bills play as collateral.22  
                                                 
21 This phrase was famously used in “The Island of Lost Souls”, a 1933 film based on the H.G. Wells novel 
“The Island of Doctor Moreau”.  
22 In May 2007, UBS shut down its internal hedge fund Dillion Read after suffering some large subprime 
related losses. See Appendix A1 for other events on these days.  
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Since the subprime crisis started on August 2007, two phases of the crisis can be 
distinguished. The first phase spans from August 2007 to August 2008. It is characterized by 
a general increment in both the mean level of the spreads around 55 b.p. and high volatility. 
Like before, the US LT reacts earlier and in a more volatile way in comparison with the 
other spreads. The second phase of the crisis starts by a generalized jump after the Lehman 
Brothers bankruptcy.23 The US LT hits up to 458 b.p. followed by the US LO by 363 b.p. 
(see Table 2, which contains their descriptive statistics). Regarding the NARF, we observe 
some differences between the Eurozone and the US. The former is almost zero up to the 
Lehman episode. In the latter, a there is a perceptible level of disquiet that grew 
substantially from July 2007 to the Lehman episode. After that episode, all spreads followed 
a downward trend, ending the sample period at pre-crisis levels. This behavior may be 
related to the announcement of generalized bail-out plans and the very lax stance of the 
monetary policy. 
The main advantage of these measures is that they are easy and quick to compute and could 
provide some intuition about the evolution of the systemic risk among banks. However, it is 
important to keep in mind that short term rates are policy targets in the current framework of 
the monetary policy applied in both Europe and the US and therefore may be subject to 
external pressures.24   
c. Structural Models 
The third group of measures is based on the framework of Merton’s model (1973). The 
basic reference is Lehar (2005) although other authors like Allenspach et al. (2007), Chan-
Lau and Kong (2004) or Gray, Merton, and Bodie (2008) use similar approaches. 
                                                 
23 The Lehman Brother bankruptcy sparked off a wave of bankruptcies and bail-outs in the US and Europe. 
See Appendix A1 for other events during that period.   
24 For example, the Federal Reserve introduced the Term Auction Facility (TAF) on 12 December 2007 with 
the key role of reducing LIBOR-OIS spreads (Cui and Maharaj, 2008). 
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Lehar (2005) and Elsinger, Lehar and Summer (2006) propose a systemic risk measure 
based on the probability of default of a given proportion of the banks in a given financial 
system. The probability of default is linked to the relationship between the banks’ asset 
value and their liabilities. In summary, the procedure to estimate this variable consists of 
recovering the bank’s asset values and correlations through Merton’s model and an 
Exponential Weighted Moving Average (EWMA) model, respectively. Then a simulation is 
carried out to infer future bank values and compare them with their liabilities according to 
different criteria in order to construct the systemic risk index: SIV and SIN, which refer to a 
Systemic risk Index based on the Value of assets and Number of defaulted banks, 
respectively.  
Under Merton’s framework, the bank’s asset value (V) follows a Geometric Brownian 
motion with drift μt and volatility σt: 
                                                               dzVdtVdV ttttt σμ +=                                               (1)  
The equity tE can be seen as a call option on the bank’s assets with a strike price equal to 
the face value of the bank’s debt tB which matures at T. Equity ( tE ) is given by 
                                                     )()( TdNBdNVE tttttt σ−−=                                      (2) 
where 
T
TBVd
t
ttt
t σ
σ )2/()/ln( 2+= . This model presents two unknowns ( tV  and tσ ) and only 
one equation; therefore, an additional one is needed. In order to solve this problem, we 
follow Duan’s methodology (Duan, 1994, 2000).25 In both studies, he proposes the 
following likelihood function: 
                                                 
25 In the literature, two alternatives have been proposed. Ronn and Verma (1986) use a framework based on the 
relationship between equity and asset volatility while Duan (1994, 2000) employs a maximum likelihood 
framework. Lehar (2005, 2006) follows Duan’s methodology because it is consistent with Merton’s model 
while the other one is not. 
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where ( )ttV σˆ  is the solution on Vt of Equation (2) while tdˆ  corresponds to td in Equation 
(3). For each week in the sample period26, parameters μt and σt are estimated, assuming that 
the maturity of the debt is one year (time until the next audit of the bank). To estimate each 
pair of parameters, we apply a rolling window with a length equal to 104 observations (i.e., 
104=m  represents two years of observations). For a given week, parameters μt and σt are 
estimated on the basis of the last 104 observations of market capitalizations ( tE ) and total 
liabilities ( tB ).
27, 28 Then we obtain ( )σtVˆ  from Equation (2), using the estimated parameters 
such that at the end we have a time series of the banks’ asset values.  
Subsequently, we estimate the covariance between banks’ asset values to construct the 
variance-covariance matrix. For this purpose, we employ the Exponential Weighted Moving 
Average (EWMA) model: 
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Following the practice in the RiskMetrics framework, parameter λ is set equal to 0.94. This 
methodology enables us to estimate a variance-covariance matrix (Σt) for each period. This 
matrix is employed to predict the future value of the bank by means of Monte Carlo 
simulations. The underlying idea is that firm asset values can be modelled through a 
                                                 
26 Parameters are estimated on a weekly basis. Lehar estimates those parameters on a monthly and yearly basis 
in 2005 and 2006, respectively. 
27 Using total liabilities of the firm implies that all the debt is insured. Although this is a simplification, given 
the bailout practices, this could be a reasonable assumption, as Laeven (2008) states. 
28 Regarding total liabilities, data is available yearly and has been transformed by linear interpolation into 
weekly data. Similar procedures are also employed by Allenspach et al. (2006) and Chan-Lau et al. (2004), 
who transform the series by either linear or quadratic interpolation to monthly data.  
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multivariate Geometric Brownian motion.  By means of Ito’s Lemma, the evolution of Vt 
can be defined as: 
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2
0
σμ                                          (5) 
where ( )uINX m ,0= and u is obtained by Cholesky Decomposition of the variance-
covariance matrix (i.e. uu '=Σ ). Hence, for each week, we obtain Vt, σt and μt, which come 
from Merton’s model. After that, we simulate 50,000 multinomial normal distributions with 
a distribution function following a Normal distribution ( )INm ,0  for each period to simulate 
different paths of V.29  
The systemic risk measure is computed as the probability that banks with total assets of 
more than a given percentage (ε) of all bank assets go bankrupt. Formally, 
                                   ∑∑
∈∈
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Fi
ti
Jj
tjtjtj VVFJjBV ,,1,1, , ξ                                   (6) 
where Vj,t+1 is the value that we have already simulated, while we consider Bj,t+1= Bj,t . This 
measure is called SIV. Figure 3 depicts the probability that 5, 10 and 15, 20 and 25% (i.e., 
five different values for ε) of the all considered banks go bankrupt for the next six months in 
the European (Panel A) and US (Panel B) banking system. In general, European and US 
systemic risk measures behave in a similar way. Before 2008, those measures were zero or 
almost zero for all ε, although the smallest one (i.e., 05.0=ε ), albeit different from zero, is 
usually at very low levels.30  Since the summer of 2008, a year after the subprime crisis 
started, those probabilities increased sharply. European measures jumped noticeably to a 
high level up to March 2009. After this date, there was a downward trend. On the contrary, 
US measures have followed a smoothly increasing trend and have maintained a similar level 
since October 2008. Table 3 contains the descriptive statistics for those measures. As can be 
                                                 
29 See Lehar (2005) for the details of the simulation. 
30 However, US banks endured a significant stress period in 2005. 
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seen in Panel A of Table 3, on average, European measures show higher values for small ε 
while US measures have higher values for large ε.  
Lehar (2005) also proposes an additional measure (SIN) that looks at the number of banks 
that default instead of the value of the firms. The formal definition is the following: 
                                          FJFJjBV tjtj ##,1,1, ξ>⊂∈∀< ++                                      (7) 
Figure 4 shows these measures. The behavior of these measures is very similar to the 
previous one although the probabilities are in general lower than in the case of SIV.   
Lehar’s measure combines two sources of data, market and accounting information. This is 
attractive given the multidimensional character of systemic risk. On the other hand, he 
makes use of the original structural model of Merton (1973), whose assumptions are usually 
too simplistic in comparison with real-world banks’ capital structure and therefore the 
estimated asset value might be biased.31  
d. CDO indexes and their tranches 
The fourth set of measures is based on CDO indexes and their tranches. Huang et al. (2009) 
propose creating a synthetic CDO whose underlying portfolio consists of debt instruments 
issued by banks to measure the systemic risk of the banking system through the spread of 
the tranche that captures losses higher than 15%. Bhansali et al. (2008) extract the 
idiosyncratic, systematic and systemic risks from U.S (CDX) and European (iTraxx) prices 
of indexed credit derivatives by means of a linearized three-jump model. In this section, we 
report the estimation of the systemic risk measure according to Bhansali et al. (2008). The 
reason is that the measure of Huang et al. (2009) is based on a non-existent product and 
hence we cannot determine its market value. This is especially important when we are 
                                                 
31 It is assumed that the firm has issued two types of securities: equity and debt. The equity receives no 
dividends. The debt is a pure discount bond where a payment of B is promised at time T. 
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considering CDO, whose theoretical valuation is extremely dependent on the assumptions 
about the joint loss distribution.  
Bhansali et al. (2008) employ a linearized version of the Longstaff et al. (2008) model in 
which the proportion of portfolio losses realized in a credit portfolio (L) is represented as a 
three-jump model, 
                                                        332211 NNNL γγγ ++=                                                   (8) 
where L0 = 0, the iγ denote jump sizes and Ni are independent Poisson counters that 
correspond to the number of jumps. Regarding the independent Poisson, constant intensities 
iλ over a period T are assumed and hence, the probability of “j” jumps for the i-th Poisson 
process Pij is as follows: 
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The risk-neutral pricing equation implies that the coupon can be solved by setting the 
premium leg (left hand side) equal to the protection leg (right hand side) such that, 
                                              ∫∫ =− TT dtdLEtDdttLEtDC 00 ][)()])([1)((                                (10) 
where D(t) denotes the discount factor. The authors propose fitting this model to both the 
CDO indexes and their tranches in order to get the jump sizes and intensities to each Poisson 
counter (one to each series). Once iγ  and iλ  have been estimated, they decompose the CDO 
indexes into three different spreads. Those spreads are in the following form: 
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where ∫∫= TT dttDtdttDA 00 )()( . See Bhansali et al. (2008) and Longstaff et al. (2007) for a 
complete description of the model and the estimation process.  
Figure 5 depicts the evolution of the European (Panel A) and US (Panel B) spreads. Before 
the subprime crisis, the CDO indexes and their tranches were mainly driven by the 
idiosyncratic component, the systemic and systematic spreads remaining almost negligible. 
At the beginning of the crisis, the systemic spreads increase substantially, achieving the first 
peak during the Bearn Stearns’ episode (see Appendix A1), in which the systemic spreads 
are higher than the idiosyncratic spreads in both economic areas. Up to the Lehman Brothers 
episode, the European and US spreads behaved similarly. After that episode, the European 
and US spreads behaved in a different way. From the Lehman episode to March 2009, in 
Europe, the systemic spread captures half of the iTraxx IG 5y’s32 behavior, whereas in the 
US, the systematic spread explains a higher proportion of the CDX IG 5y. Since March 
2009, the idiosyncratic spread has explained most of the iTraxx IG 5y while in the US it has 
remained at the same level.33 Table 4 contains the descriptive statistics for the three spreads. 
In both economic areas, we observe that, on average, the higher spread is related to the 
idiosyncratic component followed by the systemic and systematic components. 
e. Multivariate density 
Another set of measures assesses the systemic risk through recovering the multivariate 
density of the analyzed portfolio. Within this line, we follow Segoviano et al. (2009), who 
propose a set of banking stability measures based on distress dependence, which is 
estimated by the Banking System Multivariate Density (BSMD).34 BSMD is the key 
element for measuring banking stability and is estimated by means of Consistent 
                                                 
32 Note that by construction, the idiosyncratic, systematic and systemic spreads add up the CDO index spreads.  
33 At the end of the sample period, three jumps appear on the US spreads, corresponding to periods in which 
out-the-roll series are employed (see Section 3). 
34 The authors propose three different categories of measures: (a) common distress in the banks of the system; 
(b) distress between specific banks; (c) distress in the system associated with a specific bank. 
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Information Multivariate Density Optimizing (CIMDO) methodology (see Segoviano, 
2006). CIMDO methodology is characterized by the CIMDO-copula function, which is able 
to capture both linear and non-linear distress dependences and allows changes throughout 
the economic cycle.35 Once the BSMD is recovered, the authors propose two measures for 
common distress in the banking system: the Joint Probability of Distress (JPoD) and the 
Banking Stability Index (BSI). 
The estimation of the BSMD becomes harder as we increase the number of banks under 
analysis. In order to overcome this problem, we analyze this measure using “reduced 
portfolios” according to three criteria: (a) level of CDS spread; (b) level of liabilities; (c) 
level of the liabilities over market value ratio. For each period of time, we choose the three 
banks which are at the top of each classification and estimate the corresponding BSMD. 
Estimating the systemic risk measures over the “reduced portfolio” instead of over the 
whole portfolio is an approximation. However, we believe that the “reduced portfolios” 
could appropriately measure the systemic risk of the European and US banking systems 
because these categories (i.e., level of CDS spread; level of liabilities; level of the liabilities 
over market value ratio) usually give reliable indications about the soundness of the bank’s 
financial position.  
The procedure for estimating these measures could be divided into two steps. The first one 
consists of recovering the BSMD by means of CIMDO-copula while the second one 
concerns the estimation of the common distress measures.     
To recover the BSMD, we use the CIMDO-methodology. With this approach, a posterior 
multivariate distribution “p” (i.e., the CIMDO density) is obtained by using an optimization 
procedure by which a prior density “q” is updated with empirical information via a set of 
constraints based on the probability of defaults. According to the CIMDO density, the 
                                                 
35 By means of CIMDO-copula, the authors overcome the drawbacks of the characterization of distress 
dependence of financial returns with correlations, which has been one of the most popular approaches for 
measuring systemic risk.  
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BSMD is the posterior density that is the closest to the prior distribution and that is 
consistent with the empirically estimated PoDs of the banks making up the “reduced 
portfolios”. 
The optimal solution is represented by the following posterior multivariate density: 
                   ⎭⎬
⎫
⎩⎨
⎧ ⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡ ++++−= ∞∞∞ χλχλχλμ ),[3),[2),[1 ˆˆˆˆ1exp),,(),,(ˆ zdydxd xxxzyxqzyxp            (14) 
where q(x,y,z) and p(x,y,z) are the prior and posterior multivariate distributions and χ  is an 
indicator variable which takes 1 in the defined interval and zero otherwise.36 
This methodology takes the structural approach (Merton 1973) as the departing point. 
Assuming that its basic premises and economic intuition are correct, the initial hypothesis is 
that the portfolio follows a multivariate distribution, 3),,( ℜ∈zyxq , which is a Normal 
distribution ),0( IN where I is the identity matrix. 
To recover the Lagrange multipliers (i.e., 321 ˆ,ˆ,ˆ,ˆ λλλμ ), we solve the next system of equations 
of each period of time: 
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where itPoD  refers to the probability of default of each individual bank (among the three 
selected) at period t. The intuition is that the BSMD must satisfy the observed default 
probabilities for each bank. 
                                                 
36 xmi is the default threshold which is defined as ( )imid PoDx −Φ= − 11  
where PoDmi is the average of the PoD for the previous 6 months and 
1−Φ stands for the inverse of the standard 
normal CDF. 
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Once we get the Lagrange multipliers on the basis of Equation (15), the BSMD is easily 
recovered by plugging the estimated Lagrange multipliers (i.e. 321 ˆ,ˆ,ˆ,ˆ λλλμ ) into Equation 
(14). We repeat this process for each period and portfolio to obtain the BSMD of each 
portfolio over time.  
After that, we estimate the two measures of common distress:   
Joint Probability of Default (JPoD): This measure represents the probability of all banks 
in the portfolio (i.e., the three selected banks) becoming distressed. The JPoD not only 
contains changes in the individual banks’ PoD but also captures changes in the distress 
dependence among banks, which increases in times of distress. This measure is defined as: 
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Figure 6 shows the evolution of the JPD for European and US reduced portfolios. Up to the 
start of the subprime crisis, the JPD was almost zero. However, in the crisis period, there is 
a substantial increment of this risk. As can be seen in Panel A of Table 5, in both cases, the 
“reduced portfolio” that has higher risk is the one associated with the spread. On average, 
the spread portfolio’s JPD is 0.53 and 1.93 b.p. for the European and US portfolios, 
respectively. Regarding the liabilities and ratio portfolios, these averages are around 0.11 
and 0.14 for Europe and 0.44 and 0.98 for US portfolios, respectively. The reason the spread 
portfolio displays a higher level of risk could be related to the close relationship that CDSs 
and systemic risk have maintained throughout the crisis. Three periods of stronger distress 
can be seen in Figure 6: March and October 2008 and March 2009. Our results are 
consistent to the ones of Segoviano et al. (2009) during the comparable period, although in 
our case, the probabilities are lower than theirs.      
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Banking Stability Index (BSI): This measure represents the expected number of banks to 
become distressed, conditioned on the fact that at least one bank has become distressed. 
Hence, the higher this number is, the higher the instability. This measure is defined as: 
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This measure is an index which takes values between 1 and 3 due to the number of 
components in a “reduced portfolio”. The value 1 refers to the situation in which the stress 
in one institution causes no effect on the others. As can be seen in Figure 7, up to July 2007, 
this measure is almost 1. After that point, the distress between institutions is intensified. 
Panel B of Table 5 reports the descriptive statistics. There we observe that as in the JPD, the 
“CDS reduced portfolio” shows higher levels of stress. Our results are again in line with the 
findings of Segoviano et al. (2009).    
f. “Co-risk management” measures 
Our last set of systemic risk measures are based on the traditional risk management tools 
like Value-at-Risk (VaR) and Expected Shortfall (ES). Adrian et al. (2009) propose 
estimating institution i’s Co-Value-at-Risk (CoVaRi) as the whole system (i.e., portfolio)’s 
VaRs conditioned on institution i being in distress (i.e., being at its unconditional VaRi 
level). On the basis of CoVaR,  they calculate the marginal contribution of institution i to the 
overall systemic risk as the difference between CoVaR and the unconditional whole 
system’s VaR,  which is denoted as iCoVaRΔ . Therefore, iCoVaRΔ allows us to determine 
how much an institution adds to overall systemic risk. Additionally, the authors argue that 
their methodology can be easily extended to other risk management tools like ES. The 
Expected Shortfall is the basis of the systemic risk measure proposed by Acharya et al. 
(2010a). They propose a taxation system which is determined by the financial firm’s ES 
(i.e., its losses in the tail of the aggregate sector distribution). However, they do not provide 
 25
a tool for monitoring the evolution of the level of the systemic risk in the system (i.e., 
portfolio) on a daily or weekly basis, and hence, we base our analysis on the “co-risk 
management” measures of Adrian et al. (2009). 
Adrian et al. (2009) based their analysis on the growth rates of the market value of total 
financial assets ( itX ), which are defined as: 
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where itME denotes the market value of institution i and 
i
tLEV  is the ratio of total assets to 
book equity. In order to estimate this growth rate for the whole portfolio, we calculate the 
total market weighted sum of the itX across all institutions, which is: 
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VaR and CoVaR are estimated by means of quantile regression (Koenker and Bassett, 1978). 
The time-variant measures are based on the following system of equations: 
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where itM is a set of state variables. Due to the fact that we are considering two different 
portfolios (European and US), we employ two sets of state variables. The European one is 
composed of VDAX, the LIBOR-OIS referring to the Eurozone (see Section 4.b), the 
change in 3-month term Treasury Eurozone bill37, the difference between 10-year and 3-
month Treasury rates, the difference between a BBB-rated 10-year bond and 10-year 
Treasury rates and the banking index return38 of European banks. For the US portfolio, we 
                                                 
37 See Section 3 for a detailed description. 
38 Banking Indexes are return indexes which represent the theoretical aggregate growth in value of the 
constituents of the indexes. (Source, DataStream)  
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use VIX, the LIBOR-OIS of the US, the change in the 3-month Treasury bill, the difference 
between 10-year and 3-month Treasury rates, the difference between a BAA- rated 10-year 
bond and 10-year Treasury rates and the banking index return of US banks. In order to 
perform the quantile regression, we assume a confidence level of 5% (i.e., 05.0=α ). This is 
like estimating a VaR at 5%. 
Once the coefficients of Equation (21) have been estimated through quantile regression, 
VaRs and CoVaR are estimated as follows: 
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Subsequently, the marginal contribution of institution i to the overall systemic risk, which is 
called Delta Co-Value-at-Risk ( iCoVaRΔ ), is calculated as the difference between CoVaRi 
and the unconditional VaR of the whole system, 
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This measure allows us to determine how much systemic risk is associated with each bank 
in the portfolio. In order to obtain a global measure (up to now this systemic risk measure 
has been associated with each institution) to monitor the level of systemic risk in the whole 
portfolio, we aggregate the iCoVaRΔ of each bank, using two different criteria: first, equally 
weighted, and second, using weights proportional to market capitalization. 
Figure 8 shows the evolution of the iCoVaRΔ for the European (Panel A) and US (Panel B) 
portfolios. As is also the case with other systemic measures, both measures remain almost 
flat up to July 2007. Then, we distinguish three periods: the beginning of the crisis, which is 
characterized by the Bearn Stearns episode and presents a moderate increase in iCoVaRΔ  as 
well as in its volatility; the Lehman Brothers episode, which generates the highest level of 
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distress in both portfolios; and the post-Lehman Brother bankruptcy, in which 
iCoVaRΔ goes down to a level similar to the one at the beginning of 2008.  
Panel A of Table 6 reports the descriptive statistics of these measures. Within each 
economic area, two measures are estimated: equally weighted and weighted by market 
capitalization. In both portfolios, the former measure presents higher iCoVaRΔ and is more 
volatile. However, within the European portfolio, the measures are closer than within the US 
portfolio.  
Additionally, we apply the “co-risk” methodology to the ES through the quantile regression. 
The ES might provide additional insights with respect to the VaR due to the fact that the 
VaR is not a coherent measure (Artzner, Delbaen, Eber and Heath (1999)). Figure 9 shows 
the evolution of the iCoESΔ . Panel A refers to the European portfolio and Panel B to the US 
portfolio. Their behavior is similar to the behavior observed for the iCoVaRΔ . Panel B of 
Table 6 reports their descriptive statistics. We observe that, on average, the US weighted 
average measure of iCoESΔ is bigger than the European one. 
Moreover, under both co-risk measures, we may observe that equally weighted systemic risk 
measures suggest higher systemic risk levels than the ones weighted by market 
capitalization.  In the latter case, the results suggest that the largest banks (i.e., the banks 
with the highest market capitalization) are not necessarily the ones which generate the most 
systemic risk (see Table 6). 
5. Comparing Measures 
In this section, we choose the more informative variables within each group, regressing the 
measures against the influential events that have marked the main episodes of the crisis. 
Then we establish a common metric to be able to compare all of them. The common metric 
is achieved by standardizing the different systemic risk measures. Finally, we run a “horse 
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race” to rank the systemic risk measures according to their performance in a causality test, 
price discovery and McFadden R-squared. 
a. Choosing measures in each group 
Up to now several measures have been proposed within each group. However, most of them 
may provide redundant information. In this subsection, we choose the variables that provide 
more information within each group and economic area.   
To choose the most informative variables about systemic risk we use of an influential events 
variable. This variable is a dummy which reflects most important adverse news during the 
financial crisis.39 Then we run logistic regressions, using each systemic risk measure as an 
explanatory variable, and choose the systemic risk measures with the highest McFadden R-
squared. 
Given that the frequency of the measures differs, we construct two influential events 
variables on both a daily and weekly basis. The former is a dummy variable that equals 1 on 
the event day as well as on the days before and after and is equal to zero otherwise. The 
other one is a categorical variable that ranges between 0 and 3, which represents the number 
of events within the corresponding week (i.e., number 3 captures three or more events while 
0, 1 and 2 capture the corresponding number of events).  
Regarding the daily measures (i.e., Principal Component Analysis, Libor spreads, CDO 
indexes and their tranches, multivariate density copulas and “co-risk management” tools), 
we run logit regressions, while for the weekly measure (i.e., structural models), we make 
use of multinomial logit regressions. In this framework, there is not any R-squared 
equivalent to the one of Ordinary Least Squared (OLS) (Long, 1997). However, to evaluate 
the goodness-of-fit for a logistic model, pseudo R-squared has been developed. Higher 
values of pseudo R-squared indicate better model fitting, although they cannot be 
                                                 
39 A detailed description of the influential events considered can be found in Appendix A1. 
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interpreted as in OLS R-squared. Our selection criterion is based on the McFadden R-
squared40 because it has appropriate statistical properties. 
For each group of measures, we run several logistic regressions in which the independent 
variable is lagged up to 14 days and 2 weeks, respectively.41 After that, we compute the 
average R-squared for each variable. Finally, we choose those variables that provide better 
average fit within each group and economic area.  
Table 7 summarizes the average McFadden R-squared. The degree of fit provided by the 
systemic risk measures is not very high. The highest for Europe (US) is LO (LT) with R-
squared of 13% (15%).42Structural models and “co-risk management” tools do not give 
particularly good results, especially in Europe, with R-squared ranging from 1% to 10%. In 
these groups, the selected variables are the SIN05 (SIV10) and CoESΔ ( CoESΔ and 
CoVaRΔ )43 in Europe (US). Similar fits are provided by the CDO-based measure in both 
economic areas. Regarding multivariate density variables, BSI whose “reduced portfolio” is 
based on the liabilities over market value ratio (BSI) usually has the best fit.    
b. Horse race    
In this subsection, we rank the selected variables across groups within each economic area. 
Firstly, we compare the evolution of the selected measures by portfolios. In order to carry 
out a comprehensive comparison, we establish a common metric. As Nardo, Saisana, Saltelli 
and Tarantola (2005) detail, there are several procedures for determining a common 
                                                 
40 McFadden R-squared is calculated as: 
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where MFull refers to the full model and MIntercept to the model without predictors. Lˆ is the estimated likelihood. 
41 Results do not change substantially when other lags are considered. 
42 In order to construct LIBOR-TBILL in Europe, we employ a “hypothetical” Treasury yield, which is the 
weighted average of the Treasury yield of Eurozone members. The consequence of the lack of a European 
Treasury bill is that the LIBOR-TBILL does not capture the fact that in time of stress, Treasuries become 
especially valuable. On the contrary, LIBOR-TBILL provides more information in the US market, in which 
the tight relationship between bad news and Treasury bills becomes apparent. 
43 Due to the difference between CoESΔ and CoVaRΔ , we choose both to perform the horse race. 
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metric.44 However, due to the nature of our dataset, we standardize all measures so as to get 
a comparable measure. Once we have standardized the variables, we rank the systemic risk 
measures within each economic area according to three criteria: (i) causality test; (ii) price 
discovery analysis; (iii) McFadden R-squared. 
Panel A of Figure 10 depicts the evolution of the standardized European variables since 
2007. From the beginning of the period up to the start of the subprime crisis, no variable 
gives signal of an increase in systemic risk, remaining flat up to that date. During the crisis, 
the PCA variable, BSI and CDO behave similarly, although the last measure achieves its 
maximum just before the Lehman Brothers episode while the other two measures get it 
during that episode. Regarding the variable SIN05, we have transformed the original weekly 
variable into a daily variable to make the comparison easier.45 This measure does not show 
any change up to April 2008. The measure LO shows the quickest reaction after the start of 
the subprime crisis. Finally, the CoESΔ measure is very volatile. Just before the Lehman 
Brothers bankruptcy (see Appendix A1), it sharply increased, staying at high levels up to 
December 2008. 
Panel B of Figure 10 depicts the standardized US systemic risk measures. We rule out the 
pre-crisis period as well as the CoVaRΔ  in order to have a clearer picture during the crisis 
period.46 In this figure, we can see that apart from LT measure, the European and US 
systemic risk measures (Principal Component Analysis, structural credit risk model, CDO 
indexes and their tranches, multivariate densities and “co-risk” management measures) 
perform very similar in both portfolios. Regarding LT, it seems to be a leading indicator at 
the beginning of the crisis. Moreover, after the Lehman Brothers episode, this measure 
dramatically drops, finishing the sample period at levels similar to the pre-crisis period. 
                                                 
44 In the context of computing composite indicators among countries, they propose the following strategies: 
ranking indicators, standardization, re-scaling and distance to the reference country, among others. 
45 We use the same value for each week. 
46 In this subsection, we show that according to our three classifications, CoESΔ takes a better position in the 
horse race than CoVaRΔ . 
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The first result that we find is the lack of early indicators (measures that warn about 
systemic risk before the hit takes place). Apart from LT and CoESΔ  in the US (although the 
second case is less clear), no measure could be employed as an early indicator. This fact is 
especially serious in certain measures like the ones which are based on structural models.47 
The second characteristic that we find is that Libor Spreads are useful (mainly LT) while 
they are not subject to economic policies. Once they become a political-economic tool, their 
behavior is misleading and they do not appropriately measure the pressures of the financial 
system.  
Once we have compared the standardized variables, we rank the systemic risk measures 
within each economic area.  
i. Causality test  
The first classification is based on the Granger causality test (Granger, 1969). This test 
intuitively examines whether past changes in one variable, Xt, help to explain current 
changes in another variable, Yt.  If not, we conclude that Yt does not Grange cause Xt.  
Formally, the Granger causality test was based on the follow regression: 
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where Δ  is the first-difference operator and XΔ and YΔ are stationary variables. We reject 
the null hypothesis that states Yt does not Granger cause to Xt if the coefficients yiβ  are 
jointly significant based on the standard F-test. 
We perform the Granger causality test by pairs of measures within each economic area. The 
number of lags is determined on the basis of the Schwarz information criterion on the 
corresponding Vector Autoregressive (VAR) equation. In order to perform this analysis, we 
                                                 
47 We have estimated the probability that 5% of all banks considered go bankrupt for the next six months 
(SIV05). However, what we get is a lagged measure. 
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restrict the sample from January 2007 to the end of the sample period. We get the same 
results using both the standardized and non-standardized systemic risk measures.  
Table 8 summarizes the p-values for each test as well as the number of lags employed in the 
test and the corresponding ranking score, which is based on the p-values at a confidence 
level of 1%; Table 11 contains the aggregated ranking scores for the horse race. Panel A of 
Table 8 refers to the European portfolio measures. To rank the measures, we give a score of 
+1 to measure X if X causes another measure Y and we give a score of -1 to measure X if X 
is caused by Y. The best measure gets the highest positive score and the worst measure the 
highest negative score. For instance, PCA causes BSI and CoESΔ but it is not caused by any 
other measure. Hence, PCA gets a final score of +2.  LO gets a final score of +2, CDO 
scores +1, BSI scores par for the course, SIN5 scores -1 and, finally, CoESΔ scores -4.48 
Therefore, the best measures in this account are PCA and LO and the worst measure 
is CoESΔ . Panel B shows the results of the US portfolio. Applying the same procedure as 
above, PCA scores +4, LT +2, SIV10 +1, CoVaRΔ  scores par for the course, CDO -1 and, 
finally, CoESΔ and BSI both score -3.49 Therefore, PCA is again the best measure and the 
worst measures are BSI and CoESΔ . 
ii. Price Discovery  
The second classification is based on the Gonzalo and Granger’s (1995) price discovery 
methodology. This analysis allows us to determine, by pairs of measures, which measures 
reveal information more efficiently to the market. Formally, this price discovery 
methodology is based on the following VECM specification: 
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48 We observe that PCA, LO, CDO and BSI Granger cause at least two systemic risk measures while CoESΔ  
is Granger caused by all the measures considered.   
49 We observe that PCA, LT, SIV10 and CDO measures Granger-cause other systemic risk measures while 
CoESΔ  and CoVaRΔ are Granger-caused by the rest of the measures. 
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where Xt is a vector which includes a pair of systemic risk measures and tε  is a white noise 
vector. The parameter α = (α1 , α2 ) is a vector which includes the parameters that multiply 
the error correction term. By means of the Gonzalo and Granger Permanent-Transitory (PT) 
component decomposition, we measure the market contribution to price discovery (price 
discovery metrics). The percentages of price discovery of systemic risk measure i (where i 
=1, 2) can be defined from the following metrics: 
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The vector α’ represents the coefficients that determine the market contribution to price 
discovery. Thus, we conclude that a given market i leads the process of price discovery 
whenever its corresponding price discovery metric (GGi, i=1,2) is higher than 0.5. The 
 price discovery metric for an individual firm is defined such that it has a lower bound of 0 
and an upper bound of 1. 
Table 9 contains the GG metrics for European and US systemic risk measures, the number 
of employed lags and the corresponding ranking scores; Table 11 contains the aggregated 
ranking scores for the horse race. In both tables, Panels A and B refer to the European and 
US portfolio, respectively. Using the same procedure as above, the result for Europe is PCA 
+3, LO +3, CDO +2, SIN05 par for the course, BSI -3 and CoESΔ -5. Therefore, the best 
measures in this account are PCA and LO and the worst measure is CoESΔ . This is in 
agreement with the results in the Granger causality test. The results for the US are PCA and 
SIV10 +5, BSI +2, LT, CoESΔ and CDO -2 and CoVaRΔ  -6, and then the best measures are 
PCA and SIV10 and the worst is CoVaRΔ . 
iii. McFadden R-squared   
The last analysis is based on the McFadden R-squared. In Section 4.1, we make use of the 
logistic and multinomial regressions against an influential events variable to rule out those 
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variables which provide less information about the systemic events within each group of 
measures. In this section, we employ the McFadden R-squared to rank the systemic risk 
measures. This analysis provides a perspective different than the previous one because it is 
based on the relationship between the measures and the influential events instead of 
focusing on the relationship among variables.   
Table 7 contains the average of McFadden R-squared. On the basis of the McFadden R-
squared, we compare the systemic risk measures by pairs, assigning a score of +1 to the 
measure with the highest R-squared and -1 to the one with the lowest R-squared. For 
instance, in the European portfolio, LO has the highest McFadden R-squared (0.131) and 
hence its score is equal to +5 because its R-squared is higher in each of the five possible 
comparisons. Table 10 contains the ranking scores. The result for the European portfolio is 
LO +5, BSI +3, PCA +1, SIN05 -1, CoESΔ -3 and CDO -5. Therefore, the best measure in 
this ranking is LO and the worst is CDO. Regarding the US portfolio, LT gets the highest 
score (+6), followed by BSI (+4), CoESΔ  (+2), CoVaRΔ  (0). At the bottom of the ranking 
appear PCA (-2) and SIV10 (-4).  
Table 11 summarizes the horse race among the systemic risk measures. In both Europe and 
the US, simple measures (PCA and Libor spreads) consistently rank in the top places in our 
three criteria. The message seems to be clear: the simpler the measure, the better its 
performance. 
6. Conclusions 
In this paper, we compute six different sets of systemic risk measures for a sample of 
European and US banks from January 2004 to November 2009. The six measures are based 
on i) Principal components of the bank’s Credit Default Swaps, ii) Interbank interest rates, 
iii) Structural (Merton, 1973) credit risk models, iv) Collateralized Debt Obligations indexes 
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and their tranches, v) Multivariate densities computed from CDS spreads and vi) Co-Risk 
(CoVaR) measures. We then compare them using three different criteria: i) Causality tests, 
ii) Price discovery tests and iii) their relationship with an index of systemic events. We find 
that for the European market, the best indicator is the LIBOR-OIS spread followed by the 
Principal Component of the single-name CDSs, whereas the least reliable indicator is the 
Delta Co-Expected Shortfall. For the US market, the best indicator is the first Principal 
Component of the single-name CDSs followed by the LIBOR-TBILL spread, whereas the 
least reliable indicator is the systemic spread extracted from Collateralized Debt Obligations 
indexes and their tranches.  
Measures based on complex models or convoluted statistical procedures do not perform 
particularly well in our sample. It seems that “model risk” is an issue when developing 
appropriate measures of systemic risk. Therefore, the implication for investors and 
regulators looking for reliable systemic risk indicators is to stick to simple, robust indicators 
based on credit derivatives and market data interest rates. Avoiding “model noise” seems to 
be a safe bet in this case. 
Avenues for further research would be to study measures that combine information on CDS 
and interest rate variables. How to combine these measures with an individual bank’s 
characteristics to build measures of the contribution of each individual bank to the overall 
systemic risk is a topic of special relevance.    
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Appendix A1 
This list summarizes most important negative events that have occurred during the subprime 
crisis. 
2007 
May 4: UBS shut down its internal hedge fund Dillon Read after suffering some large 
subprime-related losses. 
June 20: Bear Stearns hedge funds involved in securities backed by subprime loans near 
shutting down. 
August 1: Bear Stearns was hit by a legal claim stemming from the meltdown of two of its 
hedge funds, sending its shares, already under pressure from woes with a third fund, to a 19-
month low. 
August 6: American Home Mortgage Investment Corporation (AHMI) files Chapter 11 
bankruptcy. Two days earlier, AHMI had laid off nearly ninety percent of its 7,000 
employees. A German government-led bailout of IKB Deutsche Industriebank results in 
state-owned KfW assuming up to e1 billion in expected possible losses. Bear Stearns fires 
its co-president, Warren Spector. National City Home Equity, a unit of National City of 
Cleveland, stopped taking applications for new home-equity loans and lines of credit. 
August 7: Numerous quantitative long/short equity hedge funds suddenly begin 
experiencing unprecedented losses as a result of what is believed to be liquidations by some 
managers eager to access cash during the liquidity crisis. 
August 8: Mortgage Guaranty Insurance Corporation announces it will discontinue its 
purchase of Radian Group after suffering a billion-dollar loss of its investment in Credit-
Based Asset Servicing and Securitization. 
August 9: French investment bank BNP Paribas suspends three investment funds that 
invested in subprime mortgage debt, due to a “complete evaporation of liquidity in the 
market”. 
August 10: HomeBanc files for Chapter 11. Stock market downturn. 
August 14: Sentinel Management Group suspends redemptions for investors and sells off 
$312 million worth of assets; three days later, Sentinel files for Chapter 11 bankruptcy 
protection. US and European stock indices continue to fall. 
August 15: The stock of Countrywide Financial falls around 13% on the New York Stock 
Exchange after Countrywide says foreclosures and mortgage delinquencies have risen to 
their highest levels since early 2002. 
August 16: Countrywide Financial Corporation narrowly avoids bankruptcy by taking out 
an emergency loan of $11 billion from a group of banks. 
August 23: First Magnus Financial files for Chapter 11 bankruptcy protection. 
August 26: Landesbank Baden-Württemberg (LBBW), the German public sector bank, 
agrees to buy Sachsen Landesbank for 250 million Euros. Sachsen LB is the second German 
bank that needed to be bailed out. 
August 31: Ameriquest, once the largest subprime lender in the US, goes out of business. 
September 5: Stock market downturn due to bad US economic data in the US. 
September 11: Victoria Mortgages, which has a portfolio of 440 million Euros, declares that 
they have insufficient funds. 
September 13: The Bank of England extends emergency funding to Northern Rock. The 
move came after investors withdrew support of Northern Rock amid worries that the 
institution could face short-term difficulties in raising the necessary capital in the wholesale 
market. 
September 17: Stock market downturn. 
September 21: Bear Stearns announces a 61% drop in earnings from the same quarter in 
2006. 
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September 29: Affected by the spiraling mortgage and credit crises, Internet banking 
pioneer NetBank goes bankrupt. 
October 1: the Swiss bank UBS announces that it lost $690 million US in the third quarter. 
Citigroup announces a 60% drop in earnings from the same quarter last year. 
October 5: Merrill Lynch announces a $5.5 billion US loss as a consequence of the 
subprime crisis and the loss is later revised to $8.4 billion. 
October 24: The $5.5 billion US loss announced by Merril Lynch on October 5 is revised to 
$8.4 billion, a sum that credit rating firm Standard & Poor’s called “startling”. 
October 30: Merrill Lynch (ML) CEO, Stan O’Neal, resigns after an announcement that ML 
would writedown around $7.9 billion ($3.4 billion more than ML had predicted just three 
weeks earlier) in debt. 
November 4: Citigroup CEO, Chuck Prince, resigns after an announcement that Citigroup 
may have to writedown up to $11 billion in bad debt. 
November 21: Freddie Mac announces a $2 billion loss in mortgage defaults and credit 
losses. Shares in Freddie Mac dropped 28.7% and Fannie Mae dropped 24.8% upon the 
announcement. 
November 23: Two French banks pledge $1.5 billion to bail out French bond insurer CIFG. 
December 5: Fannie Mae faces capital problems because of the deteriorating US housing 
market. 
December 19: Morgan Stanley announces $9.4 billion in writedowns from sub-prime losses. 
December 20: Bear Stearns reports its first quarterly loss in its 84-year history, a sum of 
$854 million. 
2008 
January 15: Stock market downturn. 
January 21: Stock market downturn. 
February 28: AIG announces a $5.2 billion loss for the fourth quarter of 2007, the second 
consecutive quarter of losses. The largest portion of losses come from AIG writedowns of 
$11.12 billion (pre-tax) concerning their revaluation of a large credit default swap portfolio. 
March 3: The UK’s largest bank, HSBC, reports a $17.2 billion loss on writedowns of its 
US mortgage portfolio. 
March 10: Rumors start to circulate on Wall Street that Bear Stearns could have liquidity 
problems. Investors believe rumors as financial stocks drop in value. 
March 16: Bear Stearns is acquired for $2 a share by JPMorgan Chase in a fire sale, 
avoiding bankruptcy. The deal is backed by the Federal Reserve, providing up to $30 billion 
to cover possible Bear Stearns losses. 
March 17: Stock market downturn. 
April 1: UBS announces it will writedown $19 billion in the first quarter on its US holdings. 
April 8: The International Monetary Fund’s new estimate on credit crunch losses is 
projected upwards to $945 billion. 
April 17: Merrill Lynch reveals first quarter losses of $1.96 billion and plans to cut 4,000 
jobs worldwide. 
April 18: Citigroup reports a $5.11 billion loss in the first quarter of 2008 off of a $12 
billion writedown on subprime mortgage loans and other risky assets. The largest US bank 
also announces it will cut 9,000 more jobs. 
May 9: AIG reports 1st quarter earnings results as a net loss of $7.81 billion. One of the 
principle factors of this loss was a first quarter writedown of $9.11 billion on the revaluation 
of their credit default swap portfolio. 
July 8: Shares in Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac plunge around 20% as investors sell off their 
shares. 
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July 11: Indymac Bank, a subsidiary of Independent National Mortgage Corporation 
(Indymac), is placed into the receivership of the FDIC by the Office of Thrift Supervision. It 
is the fourth-largest bank failure in United States history, and the second-largest failure of a 
regulated thrift. 
July 13: Investor speculation on the Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae bailout worsen the 
situation. 
July 17: Major banks and financial institutions had borrowed and invested heavily in 
mortgage backed securities and report losses of approximately $435 billion. 
July 31: Deutsche Bank reveals more writedowns, bringing the total so far to $7.8 billion for 
this year. Without figuring in the writedowns, the Deutsche corporate banking and securities 
division would have an income 16% less than the second quarter of last year. 
August 7: AIG shares drop 19.1%, its biggest daily drop in 39 years, after the announcement 
of a higher-than-expected $5.4 billion loss for the second quarter. This loss was blamed on 
AIG’s exposure to large subprime writedowns. 
September 5: Stock market downturn.  
September 7: Mortgage lenders Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac are rescued by the US 
government in one of the largest bailouts in US history.  
September 10: Wall Street bank Lehman Brothers posts a loss of $3.9 billion for the three 
months to August.  
September 15: Lehman Brothers files for Chapter 11 bankruptcy protection. Meanwhile, 
another US bank, Merrill Lynch, agrees to be taken over by Bank of America for $50 
billion.  
September 16: The US Federal Reserve announces an $85 billion rescue package for AIG.  
September 17: Lloyds TSB announces it is to take over Britain's biggest mortgage lender, 
HBOS, in a £12 billion deal.  
September 25: Washington Mutual is closed down by regulators and sold to JPMorgan 
Chase.  
September 28: The credit crunch hits Europe’s banking sector as the European banking and 
insurance giant Fortis is partly nationalized to ensure its survival.  
September 29: In Britain, the mortgage lender Bradford & Bingley is nationalized. The 
Icelandic government takes control of the country’s third-largest bank, Glitnir, after the 
company faces short-term funding problems.  
The US House of Representatives rejects a $700 billion rescue plan for the US financial 
system - sending shockwaves around the world. It opens up new uncertainties about how 
banks will deal with their exposure to toxic loans and how credit markets can begin to 
operate more normally.   
September 30: Dexia becomes the latest European bank to be bailed out as the deepening 
credit crisis continues to shake the banking sector.  
October 6: Germany announces a $68 billion plan to save one of the country’s biggest 
banks.  
October 7: The Icelandic government takes control of Landsbanki, the country’s second 
largest bank.  
October 13: The UK government announces plans to nationalize the Royal Bank of Scotland 
(RBS), Lloyds TSB and HBOS.  
The takeover of Wachovia by Wells Fargo is approved by regulators.  
October 14: The US government unveils a $250 billion plan to purchase stakes in a wide 
variety of banks in an effort to restore confidence in the sector.  
October 15: Stock market downturn. 
October 24: The UK is on the brink of a recession.  
November 14: The Eurozone officially slips into recession. 
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November 23: The US government announces a $20 billion rescue plan for Citigroup.  
December 1: The US recession is officially declared. 
December 11: Bank of America announces up to 35,000 job losses over three years 
following its takeover of Merrill Lynch.  
The European Central Bank, as well as central banks in the UK, Sweden and Denmark, 
slash interest rates again.  
December 19: President George W. Bush says the US government will use up to $17.4 
billion of the $700 billion meant for the banking sector to help the Big Three US carmakers, 
General Motors, Ford and Chrysler.  
2009 
January 9: US jobless rate rises to 7.2% in December, the highest in 16 years.  
January 13: German Chancellor Angela Merkel unveils an economic stimulus package 
worth about $67 billion to kick-start Europe’s largest economy.  
January 14: The UK government unveils a plan to guarantee up to £20 billion of loans to 
small and medium-sized firms.  
January 15: The European Central Bank (ECB) cuts Eurozone interest rates by half a 
percentage point to 2%.  
January 23: The UK has officially entered a recession. 
March 2: Insurance giant AIG reports the largest quarterly loss in US corporate history: 
$61.7 billion in the final three months of 2008. The firm is also to receive an extra $30 
billion from the US government as part of a revamped rescue package.  
The beginning of the year represents the worst start to a year in the history of the S&P500, 
with a drop in value of 18.62%. 
April 22: The IMF raises its forecast of total financial sector writedowns to $4 trillion. It 
says in its Global Stability Report that only $1 trillion has been written down so far, and that 
almost half the exposure is outside the US.  
May 1: One of the “big three” US carmakers, Chrysler, enters bankruptcy protection after 
pressure from the US government.   
May 8: Ten of the biggest US banks have failed their stress tests and need fresh capital, the 
US Treasury announces. It says they need to raise an additional $74.6 billion, with the Bank 
of America the most exposed.  
June 1: The world’s largest carmaker, GM, enters bankruptcy protection . 
June 10: Global oil consumption falls for the first time since 1993 in 2008.  
June 11: Japan’s economy contracts at an annualized rate of 14.2% in the first three months 
of 2009, a record rate of decline.  
July 15: The UK jobless rate increases to 7.6%, the highest in more than 10 years.  
July 24: The UK economy contracts more than double the figure economists had expected.  
August 3: HSBC reports this represents a 51% decline in profits in relation to the previous 
year, although the published figure was in line with analysts’ predictions.  
August 7: The Royal Bank of Scotland announces a £1 billion loss for the first half of 2009 
and warns that the second half results are likely to be substantially weaker.  
August 27: The US GDP fell annually by 1% in Q2 2009. The data serves as confirmation 
that the global financial crisis represents the longest running recession on record for the US 
economy as well as being the deepest since the Great Recession. 
October 26: The European Commission has ordered ING to sell off its insurance and 
investment management business. 
November 3: The UK Treasury announces that a further £33.5 billion will be injected into 
the Royal Bank of Scotland in order to ensure that the bank survives the current crisis, 
bringing the total government investment in the institution up to 84%.  
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Tables 
   Table 1: Composition of Bank Portfolios 
This table shows the European and US banks which constitute the two portfolios under 
analysis. On the left hand side are the European banks as well as their main market and 
the average portfolio weights on the basis of their market capitalization during the sample 
period. On the right hand side, we summarize the same information for the US banks.                               
 
Bank
Average 
Portfolio 
Weights
Bank
Average 
Portfolio 
Weights
Barclays Bank 0.05
Bank of America 
Corp
0.20
BBVA 0.05 Capital One FC 0.03
BNP PARIBAS 0.06 Citigroup Inc 0.22
Commerzbank 0.01 Comerica 0.01
Credit Agricole 0.04 Harris Corp 0.01
Credit Suisse 0.05
JPMorgan Chase & 
Co
0.19
Danske Bank 0.02 Keycorp 0.01
Deutsche Bank 0.04
Morgan Stanley BK 
NA
0.06
Dexia 0.02 PNC 0.03
HSBC Bank 0.16 State Street Corp 0.03
ING Bank 0.05 Suntrust BK 0.03
Intesa Sanpaolo 0.04 US BC 0.07
KBC 0.02 Wells Fargo & Co 0.12
Lloyds TSB 0.04
Nordea Bank 0.03
RBS 0.07
Santander 0.08
Societe Generale 0.04
UBS 0.07
Unicredito 0.05
US
US
US
US
US
Italy
Market
US
US
US
US
US
US
US
US
United Kingdom
Spain
France
Switzerland
Italy
Belgium
United Kingdom
Sweden
Germany
Belgium
United Kingdom
Netherlands
Germany
France
Switzerland
Denmark
United Kingdom
Market
Spain
France
European Portfolio US Portfolio
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                     
 44
  Table 2: Libor Spreads Descriptive Statistics 
This table reports the descriptive statistics of the two Libor spreads: LIBOR-OIS (LO) and 
LIBOR-TBILL (LT) for the Eurozone and US, measured on basis points. It contains the 
mean, standard deviation, median, the first and third quartile, maximum and minimum 
value. Moreover, the frequencies of the data, number of observations and the initial and 
final date are also reported.   
 LO EU LT EU LO US LT US
Mean 30.398 39.283 36.992 66.072
SD 39.480 44.576 50.699 62.449
Median 5.700 17.525 10.900 39.150
Q1 4.488 9.907 7.487 27.770
Q3 56.857 63.369 60.938 93.918
Maximum 194.325 351.625 363.875 458.795
Minimum -1.850 -29.787 -1.062 14.240
Frequency Daily Daily Daily Daily
Nº Observation 1525 1525 1525 1525
Initial Date 01-01-04 01-01-04 01-01-04 01-01-04
Final Date 04-11-09 04-11-09 04-11-09 04-11-09  
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Table 3: Descriptive Statistics for the Systemic risk Index based on the Value of assets 
(SIV) and for the Systemic risk Index based on the Number of defaulted banks (SIN) 
This table reports the descriptive statistics for the Systemic risk Indexes based on the 
Value of assets (SIV) and for the Systemic risk Indexes based on the Number of defaulted 
banks (SIN), for different proportions (0.25, 0.2, 0.15, 0.1 and 0.05). Panel A refers to the 
European (lhs) and the US (rhs) SIV and Panel B refers to the European (lhs) and the US 
(rhs) SIN. It contains the mean, standard deviation, median, the first and third quartile, 
maximum and minimum value. Moreover, the frequencies of the data, the number of 
observations and the initial and final date are reported.  
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0.25 0.2 0.15 0.1 0.05 0.25 0.2 0.15 0.1 0.05
Mean 0.041 0.069 0.103 0.143 0.192 0.035 0.065 0.106 0.168 0.265
SD 0.113 0.178 0.241 0.301 0.346 0.102 0.165 0.239 0.321 0.360
Median 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.004 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.002 0.082
Q1 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.005
Q3 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.008 0.172 0.000 0.001 0.016 0.110 0.405
Maximum 0.606 0.819 0.931 0.992 1.000 0.616 0.820 0.930 0.990 1.000
Minimum 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Frequency Weekly Weekly Weekly Weekly Weekly Weekly Weekly Weekly Weekly Weekly
Number of 
Observatio
305 305 305 305 305 305 305 305 305 305
Initial Date 02-01-04 02-01-04 02-01-04 02-01-04 02-01-04 02-01-04 02-01-04 02-01-04 02-01-04 02-01-04
Final Date 30-10-09 30-10-09 30-10-09 30-10-09 30-10-09 30-10-09 30-10-09 30-10-09 30-10-09 30-10-09
0.25 0.2 0.15 0.1 0.05 0.25 0.2 0.15 0.1 0.05
Mean 0.039 0.061 0.093 0.124 0.202 0.061 0.122 0.155 0.166 0.219
SD 0.103 0.149 0.208 0.258 0.328 0.132 0.242 0.256 0.262 0.317
Median 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.003 0.040 0.000 0.000 0.008 0.012 0.063
Q1 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.014 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.005
Q3 0.000 0.001 0.009 0.025 0.185 0.007 0.014 0.163 0.173 0.218
Maximum 0.502 0.667 0.810 0.926 1.000 0.550 0.754 0.775 0.782 0.911
Minimum 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Frequency Weekly Weekly Weekly Weekly Weekly Weekly Weekly Weekly Weekly Weekly
Number of 
Observatio
ns
305 305 305 305 305 305 305 305 305 305
Initial Date 02-01-04 02-01-04 02-01-04 02-01-04 02-01-04 02-01-04 02-01-04 02-01-04 02-01-04 02-01-04
Final Date 30-10-09 30-10-09 30-10-09 30-10-09 30-10-09 30-10-09 30-10-09 30-10-09 30-10-09 30-10-09
Panel A: Systemic risk Index based on the Value of assets (SIV) 
Proportion 
(ε)
SIN SIV
Proportion 
(ε)
European Portfolio US Portfolio
Panel B: Systemic risk Index based on the Number of defaulted banks (SIN)
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Table 4: Descriptive Statistics for CDO Index and Tranches Measures 
This table reports the descriptive statistics of the Idiosyncratic, Systematic and Systemic 
spreads which  are extracted from both CDO indexes of the corresponding economic area 
(i.e., the Eurozone and the US) and their tranches measured on basis points. The left hand 
side refers to the European spreads and the right hand side refers to the US spreads. They 
contain the mean, standard deviation, median, the first and third quartile, maximum and 
minimum value. Moreover, the frequencies of the data, number of observations and the 
initial and final date are reported. 
 
Systemic Systematic Idiosyncratic Systemic Systematic Idiosyncratic
Mean 29.953 10.964 36.574 31.552 29.872 44.667
SD 40.890 12.924 17.785 26.328 41.163 17.789
Median 8.281 2.097 30.247 27.860 11.309 41.604
Q1 3.281 1.468 25.463 5.455 1.614 32.622
Q3 39.594 19.410 41.462 53.382 35.428 53.007
Maximum 164.963 50.714 99.409 105.624 182.840 145.240
Minimum 0.090 0.632 17.124 1.254 0.743 24.514
Frequency Daily Daily Daily Daily Daily Daily
Nº Observation 1224 1224 1224 946 946 946
Initial Date 25-02-05 25-02-05 25-02-05 22-03-06 22-03-06 22-03-06
Final Date 04-11-09 04-11-09 04-11-09 04-11-09 04-11-09 04-11-09
European CDO US CDO 
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Table 5: Descriptive Statistics of the Joint Probability of Default (JPD) and Banking 
Stability Index (BSI) 
This table represents the descriptive statistics of the Joint Probability of Default (JPD) and 
Banking Stability Index (BSI) for the two economic areas: Europe and the US. Panel A 
contains the JPD and the information is reported on basis points; Panel B contains the 
BSI. Within each economic area, three “reduced portfolios” are considered: spread, 
liabilities and liabilities over market value ratio. Each portfolio is composed of the three 
banks at the top of each classification. It contains the mean, standard deviation, median, 
the first and third quartile, maximum and minimum value. Moreover, the frequency of the 
data, the number of observations and the initial and final date are reported. 
 
Reduced 
Portfolios
Spread Liabilities
Liabilities / 
Market Value Spread Liabilities
Liabilities / 
Market Value
Mean 0.5637 0.107 0.138 1.9386 0.443 0.976
SD 1.2438 0.221 0.326 4.4609 1.103 2.403
Median 0.0028 0.000 0.001 0.0195 0.004 0.005
Q1 0.0007 0.000 0.000 0.0099 0.002 0.002
Q3 0.3378 0.080 0.157 1.2126 0.193 0.377
Maximum 11.7754 1.420 5.585 42.4871 7.889 26.452
Minimum 0.0002 0.000 0.000 0.0025 0.001 0.001
Frequency Daily Daily Daily Daily Daily Daily
Nº Observations 1525 1525 1525 1525 1525 1525
Initial Date 01-01-04 01-01-04 01-01-04 01-01-04 01-01-04 01-01-04
Final Date 04-11-09 04-11-09 04-11-09 04-11-09 04-11-09 04-11-09
Reduced 
Portfolios
Spread Liabilities Liabilities / 
Market Value
Spread Liabilities Liabilities / 
Market Value
Mean 1.0205 1.012 1.014 1.033 1.0193 1.025
SD 0.0097 0.007 0.008 0.017 0.0081 0.012
Median 1.0066 1.004 1.005 1.013 1.0073 1.008
Q1 1.0041 1.002 1.003 1.010 1.0056 1.006
Q3 1.0327 1.020 1.025 1.051 1.0273 1.034
Maximum 1.1143 1.054 1.090 1.179 1.0986 1.149
Minimum 1.0028 1.001 1.002 1.006 1.0041 1.005
Frequency Daily Daily Daily Daily Daily Daily
Nº Observations 1525 1525 1525 1525 1525 1525
Initial Date 01-01-04 01-01-04 01-01-04 01-01-04 01-01-04 01-01-04
Final Date 04-11-09 04-11-09 04-11-09 04-11-09 04-11-09 04-11-09
Panel A: Joint Probability of Default
Panel B: Banking Stability Index
European Reduced Portfolios US Reduced Portfolios
European Reduced Portfolios US Reduced Portfolios
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Table 6: Descriptive Statistics of the Co-Risk Management Measures 
This table represents the descriptive statistics of the Co-Risk Management Measures. 
Panel A refers to the European and US portfolios’ Delta Co-Value-at-Risk (ΔCoVaR). 
Within each portfolio, two measures are calculated: (i) equally weighted; (ii) weighted by 
marked capitalization. Panel B contains the information relative to the European and US 
portfolios’ Delta Co-Expected-Shortfall (ΔCoES). It contains the mean, standard 
deviation, median, the first and third quartile, maximum and minimum value. Moreover, 
the frequency of the data, the number of observations and the initial and final date are 
reported. 
 
Equally 
Weighted
Weighted by 
Market 
Equally 
Weighted
Weighted by 
Market 
Mean 0.0034 0.003 0.0039 0.003
SD 0.0017 0.002 0.0012 0.001
Median 0.0030 0.002 0.0033 0.003
Q1 0.0024 0.002 0.0031 0.002
Q3 0.0039 0.003 0.0044 0.003
Maximum 0.0180 0.015 0.0126 0.008
Minimum -0.0009 -0.001 0.0029 0.000
Frequency Daily Daily Daily Daily
Nº Observations 1522 1522 1522 1522
Initial Date 05-01-04 05-01-04 05-01-04 05-01-04
Final Date 03-11-09 03-11-09 03-11-09 03-11-09
Equally 
Weighted
Weighted by 
Market 
Equally 
Weighted
Weighted by 
Market 
Mean 0.0034 0.003 0.005 0.003
SD 0.0013 0.001 0.002 0.002
Median 0.0031 0.002 0.004 0.002
Q1 0.0026 0.002 0.003 0.002
Q3 0.0038 0.003 0.005 0.004
Maximum 0.0113 0.010 0.016 0.012
Minimum 0.0016 0.001 0.002 0.000
Frequency Daily Daily Daily Daily
Nº Observations 1522 1522 1522 1522
Initial Date 05-01-04 05-01-04 05-01-04 05-01-04
Final Date 03-11-09 03-11-09 03-11-09 03-11-09
European Portfolios US Portfolios
Panel B: ΔCoES
US PortfoliosEuropean Portfolios
Panel A: ΔCoVaR
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Table 7: McFadden R-Squared 
This table reports the average McFadden R-squared for the systemic risk measures 
belonging to: (i) Princial Component Analysis; (ii) Libor Spread; (iii) Structural Model; 
(iv) CDO indexes and their tranches; (v) Multivariate Density; (vi) Co-Risk groups of 
measures. For each systemic risk measure, we compute logistic regressions in which we 
modify the number of lags of the independent variable (the number of lags appears in the 
third column). Then we calculate the average of the McFaddend R-squared for each 
measure. Within each group, we report this information to the European and the US 
portfolio. The reported measures are: (i) PCA; (ii) LIBOR-OIS (LO) and LIBOR-TBILL 
(LT); (iii) Systemic risk Index based on the Number of defaulted banks (SIN) and on the 
Value of assets (SIV) for different percentages (25, 20, 15, 10 and 5); (iv) Systemic 
component extracted from the CDO indexes and their tranches; (v) Banking Stability 
Index (BSI) and Index (BSI) and Joint Probability of Default (JPD) for the three 
“reference portfolios”: spread, liabilities and liabilities over market value ratio; (vi) Delta 
Co-Value-at-risk (ΔCoVaR) and Delta Co-Expected-Shortfall (ΔCoES) for the 
aggregations, Equally Weighted (EW) and Weighted by Market Capitalization (WCap).  
 Group Portfolio Nº Lags
PCA
14 0.1243
PCA
14 0.1092
LO LT
14 0.1314 0.1263
LO LT
14 0.1184 0.1520
SIN25 SIN20 SIN15 SIN10 SIN05
2 0.0265 0.0301 0.0382 0.0470 0.0577
SIV25 SIV20 SIV15 SIV10 SIV05
2 0.0255 0.0324 0.0404 0.0451 0.0533
SIN25 SIN20 SIN15 SIN10 SIN05
2 0.0092 0.0171 0.0273 0.0407 0.0575
SIV25 SIV20 SIV15 SIV10 SIV05
2 0.0459 0.0460 0.0672 0.0683 0.0571
CDO
14 0.0453
CDO
14 0.0638
BSI_Spread BSI_Liabilities BSI_Ratio
14 0.1041 0.1074 0.1259
JPD_Spread JPD_Liabilities JPD_Ratio
14 0.0386 0.0365 0.0457
BSI_Spread BSI_Liabilities BSI_Ratio
14 0.1140 0.0783 0.1170
JPD_Spread JPD_Liabilities JPD_Ratio
14 0.0539 0.0179 0.0614
ΔCoVaR_EW ΔCoVaR_WCap ΔCoES_EW ΔCoES_WCap
14 0.0378 0.0395 0.0538 0.0460
ΔCoVaR_EW ΔCoVaR_WCap ΔCoES_EW ΔCoES_WCap
14 0.1099 0.1125 0.1036 0.1129
European
US
US
US
European
PC
A European
US
C
O
-R
IS
K
 
European
US
LI
B
O
R
 
SP
R
EA
D
S
ST
R
U
C
TU
R
A
L 
M
O
D
EL
S
European
USM
U
LT
IV
A
R
IA
TE
 
D
EN
SI
TI
ES
European
C
D
O
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Table 8: Granger Causality Test 
This table reports the p-value of the null hypothesis (Ho), the employed number of lags 
and the corresponding ranking scores. To rank the measures, we give a measure +1 if it 
Granger causes another measure at 1% of confidence level and -1 if it is Granger caused 
by another measure. Panel A refers to the European portfolio such that in Panel A.1 we 
report the p-values and in Panel A.2 we report the ranking scores. The measures 
considered are the First Principal Component of the European portfolio of single CDS 
(PCA); LIBOR-OIS (LO); Systemic risk Index based on the Number of defaulted banks 
(SIN); Systemic component extracted from the iTraxx IG 5y (CDO); Banking Stability 
Index (BSI) based on the liabilities over market value ratio; Delta Co-Expected-Shortfall 
(ΔCoES). Panel B refers to the US portfolio such that in Panel B.1 we report the p-values 
and in Panel B.2 we report the ranking scores. The measures considered are the First 
Principal Component of the US portfolio of single CDS; LIBOR-TBILL (LT); Systemic 
risk Index based on the Value of defaulted assets (SIV); Systemic component extracted 
from the CDX IG 5y (CDO); Banking Stability Index (BSI) based on the liabilities over 
market value ratio; Delta Co-Expected-Shortfall (ΔCoES); Delta Co-Value-at-Risk 
(ΔCoVaR).  
 
Variable 1 (V.1) PCA PCA PCA PCA PCA LO LO LO
Variable 2 (V.2) LO SIN05 CDO BSI ΔCoES SIN05 CDO BSI
Ho: V. 2 does not Granger Cause V. 1 0.208 0.253 0.111 0.041 0.998 0.000 0.063 0.325
Ho: V. 1 does not Granger Cause V. 2 0.538 0.026 0.348 0.000 0.000 0.008 0.000 0.185
Number of Lags 2 1 1 4 4 5 2 4
Variable 1 (V.1) LO SIN05 SIN05 SIN05 CDO CDO BSI
Variable 2 (V.2) ΔCoES CDO BSI ΔCoES BSI ΔCoES ΔCoES
Ho: V. 2 does not Granger Cause V. 1 0.109 0.457 0.000 0.000 0.076 0.026 0.348
Ho: V. 1 does not Granger Cause V. 2 0.000 0.261 0.021 0.003 0.001 0.000 0.000
Number of Lags 6 2 7 5 4 3 4
Variable PCA LO CDO BSI SIN05 ΔCoES
Scoring 2 2 1 0 -1 -4
Variable 1 (V.1) PCA PCA PCA PCA PCA PCA LT LT
Variable 2 (V.2) LT SIV10 CDO BSI ΔCoES ΔCoVaR SIV10 CDO
Ho: V. 2 does not Granger Cause V. 1 0.000 0.041 0.297 0.332 0.250 0.048 0.026 0.322
Ho: V. 1 does not Granger Cause V. 2 0.951 0.005 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.211 0.328
Number of Lags 3 5 2 3 4 7 5 2
Variable 1 (V.1) LT LT LT SIV10 SIV10 SIV10 SIV10 CDO
Variable 2 (V.2) BSI ΔCoES ΔCoVaR CDO BSI ΔCoES ΔCoVaR BSI
Ho: V. 2 does not Granger Cause V. 1 0.036 0.008 0.005 0.232 0.039 0.018 0.043 0.000
Ho: V. 1 does not Granger Cause V. 2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.117 0.000 0.002 0.022 0.003
Number of Lags 4 4 5 5 5 5 5 4
Variable 1 (V.1) CDO CDO BSI BSI ΔCoES
Variable 2 (V.2) ΔCoES ΔCoVaR ΔCoES ΔCoVaR ΔCoVaR
Ho: V. 2 does not Granger Cause V. 1 0.000 0.099 0.000 0.000 0.000
Ho: V. 1 does not Granger Cause V. 2 0.174 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Number of Lags 4 3 4 4 7
Variable PCA LT SIV10 ΔCoVaR CDO BSI ΔCoES
Scoring 4 2 1 0 -1 -3 -3
Panel A.1: P-Value
Panel A: European Portfolio
Panel B.2: Ranking Scores
Panel B.1: P-Values
Panel B: US Portfolio
Panel A.2: Ranking Scores
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Table 9: Price Discovery Test 
This table reports the market contribution to the price discovery by means of Gonzalo and 
Granger permanent-transitory (PT) component decomposition, the number of lags 
employed in the analysis and the corresponding ranking scores. To rank the measures, we 
give a score of +1 if the measure gets values larger than 0.5 in the corresponding price 
discovery metric and -1 if it gets values lower than 0.5. Panel A refers to the European 
portfolio such that in Panel A.1 we report the Gonzalo and Granger permanent-transitory 
(PT) component decomposition and the employed number of lags and in Panel A.2 we 
report the ranking scores. The measures considered are the First Principal Component of 
the European portfolio of single CDS (PCA); LIBOR-OIS (LO); Systemic risk Index 
based on the Number of defaulted banks (SIN); Systemic component extracted from the 
iTraxx IG 5y (CDO); Banking Stability Index (BSI) based on the liabilities over market 
value ratio; Delta Co-Expected-Shortfall (ΔCoES). Panel B refers to the US portfolio. The 
measures considered are the First Principal Component of the US portfolio of single CDS; 
LIBOR-TBILL (LT); Systemic risk Index based on the Value of defaulted assets (SIV); 
Systemic component extracted from the CDX IG 5y (CDO); Banking Stability Index 
(BSI) based on the liabilities over market value ratio; Delta Co-Expected-Shortfall 
(ΔCoES); Delta Co-Value-at-Risk (ΔCoVaR).  
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Variable  1 PCA PCA PCA PCA PCA LO LO LO
GGvariable 1 0.585 0.549 0.238 1.000 0.986 0.859 0.934 0.670
Variable  2 LO SIN05 CDO BSI ΔCoES SIN05 CDO BSI
GGvariable 2 0.415 0.451 0.762 0.000 0.014 0.141 0.066 0.330
Number of Lags 20 25 15 25 16 6 11 15
Variable  1 LO SIN05 SIN05 SIN05 CDO CDO BSI
GGvariable 1 1 Na 0.616 0.890 0.937 0.872 1
Variable  2 ΔCoES CDO BSI ΔCoES BSI ΔC oES ΔCoES
GGvariable 2 0 Na 0.384 0.110 0.063 0.128 0
Number of Lags 8 Na 20 20 15 17 17
Variable  PCA LO CDO SIN05 BSI ΔCoES
Scoring 3 3 2 0 -3 -5
Variable  1 PCA PCA PCA PCA PCA PCA LT LT
GGvariable 1 0.886 0.496 0.873 1 0.764 0.947 0.219 0.425
Variable  2 LT SIV10 CDO BSI ΔCoES ΔCoVaR SIV10 CDO
GGvariable 2 0.114 0.504 0.127 0 0.236 0.053 0.781 0.575
Number of Lags 18 17 17 25 15 18 16 20
Variable  1 LT LT LT SIV10 SIV10 SIV10 SIV10 CDO
GGvariable 1 0.123 0.747 0.923 0.742 0.716 0.802 0.924 0.400
Variable  2 BSI ΔCoES ΔCoVaR CDO BSI ΔC oES ΔCoVaR BSI
GGvariable 2 0.877 0.253 0.077 0.258 0.284 0.198 0.076 0.600
Number of Lags 20 14 10 23 25 20 15 20
Variable  1 CDO CDO BSI BSI ΔCoES
GGvariable 1 0.284 0.802 0.641 0.930 0.759
Variable  2 ΔCoES ΔCoVaR ΔCoES ΔCoVaR ΔCoVaR
GGvariable 2 0.716 0.198 0.359 0.070 0.241
Number of Lags 18 12 17 26 18
Variable  PCA SIV10 BSI LT CDO ΔCoES ΔCoVaR
Scoring 5 5 2 -2 -2 -2 -6
Panel A.2: Ranking Scores
Panel A.1: Gonzalo and Granger Permanent-Transitory Component Decomposition
Panel A.2: Ranking Scores
Panel A: European Portfolio
Panel B.1:  Gonzalo and Granger Permanent-Transitory Component Decomposition
Panel B: US Portfolio
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Table 10: Ranking Scores by McFadden R-squared 
This table contains the ranking scores according to McFadden R-squared. To rank the 
measures, we compare the McFadden R-squared by pairs and assign a score of +1 to the 
measure with the highest R-squared and -1 to the one with the lowest R-squared. Panel A 
refers to the European portfolio. The measures considered are the First Principal 
Component of the European portfolio of single CDS (PCA); LIBOR-OIS (LO); Systemic 
risk Index based on the Number of defaulted banks (SIN); Systemic component extracted 
from the iTraxx IG 5y (CDO); Banking Stability Index (BSI) based on the liabilities over 
market value ratio; Delta Co-Expected-Shortfall  (ΔCoES). Panel B refers to the US 
portfolio. The measures considered are the First Principal Component of the US portfolio 
of single CDS; LIBOR-TBILL (LT); Systemic risk Index based on the Value of defaulted 
assets (SIV); Systemic component extracted  from the CDX IG 5y (CDO); Banking 
Stability Index (BSI) based on the liabilities over market value ratio; Delta Co-Expected-
Shortfall (ΔCoES); Delta Co-Value-at-Risk (ΔCoVaR). 
 
Variable LO BSI PCA SIN05 ΔCoES CDO
Scoring 5 3 1 -1 -3 -5
Variable LT BSI ΔCoES ΔCoVaR PCA SIV10 CDO
Scoring 6 4 2 0 -2 -4 -6
Panel A: European Portfolio
Panel B: US Portfolio
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Table 11: Horse Race 
This table reports the ranking scores of the systemic risk measures among three 
classifications: (i) Causality Test; (ii) Price Discovery; (iii) McFadden R-squared. We also 
report the final score, which is the sum of the scores among classifications. Panel A refers 
to the European portfolio. The measures considered are the First Principal Component of  
the European portfolio of single CDS (PCA); LIBOR-OIS (LO); Systemic risk Index 
based on the Number of defaulted banks (SIN); Systemic component extracted from the 
iTraxx IG 5y (CDO); Banking Stability Index (BSI) based on the liabilities over market 
value ratio; Delta Co-Expected-Shortfall (ΔCoES). Panel B reports the US portfolio 
systemic risk measures: the First Principal Component of the US portfolio of single CDS;  
LIBOR-TBILL (LT); Systemic risk Index based on the Value of defaulted assets (SIV); 
Systemic component extracted  from the CDX IG 5y (CDO); Banking Stability Index 
(BSI) based on the  liabilities over market value ratio; Delta Co-Expected-Shortfall 
(ΔCoES); Delta Co-Value-at-Risk (ΔCoVaR).  
 
Causality 
Test
Price 
Discovery
McFadden   
R-squared
Final Score
PCA 2 3 1 6
LO 2 3 5 10
SIN05 -1 0 -1 -2
CDO 1 2 -5 -2
BSI 0 -3 3 0
ΔCoES -4 -5 -3 -12
Causality 
Test
Price 
Discovery
McFadden   
R-squared
Final Score
PCA 4 5 -2 7
LT 2 -2 6 6
SIV10 1 5 -4 2
CDO -1 -2 -6 -9
BSI -3 2 4 3
ΔCoES -3 -2 2 -3
ΔCoVaR 0 -6 0 -6
Panel A: European Portfolio
Panel B: US Portfolio
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Figures  
 
 
Figure 1: Systemic Risk Measures based on Principal Component Analysis 
This figure represents the First Principal Component of the European and US portfolios of 
single CDS. These variables are measured on basis points. 
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Figure 2: Systemic Risk Measures based on Libor Spreads 
This figure represents the spreads between LIBOR and the Overnight Interest Rate (LO) 
and between LIBOR and Treasury Bills (LT). Additionally, we compute a "Natives Are 
Restless Factor" (NARF) as the difference between LT and LO. The dashed area 
represents the size of that factor. Panel A refers to the Eurozone portfolio and Panel B 
refers to the US portfolio. These spreads are measured on basis points. 
 Panel A: European Portfolio
Panel B: US Portfolio
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Figure 3: Systemic risk Index based on the Value of defaulted assets (SIV) 
This figure depicts the SIV measure for different proportions which range from 25% to 
5%. Panel A refers to the European portfolio and Panel B refers to the US portfolio. 
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Figure 4: Systemic risk Index based on the Number of defaulted banks (SIN) 
This figure depicts the SIN measure for different proportions which range from 25% to 
5%. Panel A refers to the European portfolio and Panel B refers to the US portfolio. 
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Figure 5: CDO Index and Their Tranches 
This figure depicts the Idiosyncratic, Systematic and Systemic spreads which are extracted 
from both CDO indexes of the corresponding economic area and their tranches. Panel A 
refers to the European portfolios and Panel B refers to the US portfolios. These variables 
are measured in basis points.  
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Figure 6: Joint Probability of Default (JPD) 
This figure depicts the JPD measure for the different “reduced portfolios”, spread, 
liabilities and the liabilities over market value ratio. Each portfolio is composed of the 
three banks at the top of each classification. Panel A refers to the European portfolios and 
Panel B refers to the US portfolios. This variable is measured in basis points.  
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Figure 7: Banking Stability Index (BSI) 
This figure depicts the BSI measure for the different “reduced portfolios”, spread, 
liabilities and the liabilities over market value ratio. Each portfolio is composed of the 
three banks at the top of each classification. Panel A refers to the European portfolios and 
Panel B refers to the US portfolios.  
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Figure 8: Delta Co-Value-at-Risk 
This figure represents the Delta Co-Value-at-Risk (ΔCoVaR) measure calculated as an 
equally weighted average and a weighted average by market capitalization. Panel A refers 
to the European portfolio and Panel B to the US portfolio.   
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Figure 9: Delta Co-Extected-Shortfall 
This figure represents the Delta Co-Expected-Shortfall (ΔCoES) measures calculated as 
an equally weighted average and a weighted average by market capitalization. Panel A 
refers to the European portfolio and Panel B to the US portfolio.  
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Figure 10: Standardized Systemic Risk Measures 
This figure depicts the evolution of the selected standardized systemic risk measures. 
Panel A reports the European portfolio measures: Principal Component Analysis (PCA), 
European portfolio measures: the First Principal Component of the European portfolio of 
single CDS (PCA); LIBOR-OIS (LO); Systemic risk Index based on the Number of 
defaulted banks (SIN); Systemic component extracted from the iTraxx IG 5y (CDO); 
Banking Systemic component extracted from the iTraxx IG 5y (CDO); Banking Stability 
Index (BSI) based on the liabilities over market value ratio; Delta Co-Expected-Shortfall 
(ΔCoES). Panel B reports the US portfolio systemic risk measures: the First Principal 
Component of the US portfolio of single CDS; LIBOR-TBILL (LT); Systemic risk Index 
based on the Value of defaulted assets (SIV); Systemic component extracted from the 
CDX IG 5y (CDO); Banking Stability Index (BSI) based on the liabilities over market 
value ratio; Delta Co-Expected-Shortfall (ΔCoES).  
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